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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
is found in §78-2-2(3)(d)(ii) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Where improvements are not included in determining an 
assessment, can the County go back the following year and correct 
the assessment and collect additional taxes notwithstanding the 
fact that the taxes levied for the prior year were paid in full 
when they were due and the property has since changed hands? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1984, the property in question was assessed by the 
Salt Lake County taxing authority ("County"). The record owner 
of the property fully paid the 1984 assessment when it was due. 
In 1985 the property in question was sold to Respondent Sunkist 
Service Company ("Sunkist"). Later in 1985 the County discovered 
that a building erected on the property had not been included in 
the 1984 assessment. The County then sought to reassess the pro-
perty and include the value of the improvements. 
A hearing was held on June 24, 1986, before the Utah 
State Tax Commission and in its decision of July 23, 1986, it con-
cluded the subject property had been "undervalued" as a result of 
the Countyfs error and held that it did not "escape" assessment. 
A formal hearing was requested by petitioner in the 
matter. The Utah State Tax Commission issued a formal decision 
dated July 2, 1987, affirming the decision of July 23, 1986. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 1984, the property in question was assessed by the 
respondent. However, certain improvements located thereon were 
not considered in arriving at a valuation of the property. The 
taxes which were determined to be due and owing based on the 
County's assessment were paid on or before their due date in 1984. 
Prior to the reassessment of the property, the property 
changed hands and the purchaser (Respondent herein) assumed that 
the taxes assessed and paid by its predecessor in interest repre-
sented the entire tax obligation affecting the property for the 
year 1984. 
In 1985 the County realized that the improvements had 
been omitted in determining the 1984 valuation and it attempted 
to collect $46,296.69 in lost revenue from the new owner through 
an appendix roll. The amount of the assessment is not in dispute 
here, but the Respondent strongly disputes its obligation to pay 
said amount. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Respondent contends that not including improvements in 
determining an assessment results in an "underassessment" of the 
property. This is particularly so where taxes levied for the 
prior year on the property were paid in full when they were due 
and the property has since changed hands with the purchaser 
reasonably assuming its predecessor in interest paid the entire 
tax obligation for the tax year 1984. 
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Petitioner contends that because it omitted the improve-
ments from its assessment, the property has escaped assessment 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann, §59-5-17 (1953, as amended). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
IMPROVEMENTS NOT CONSIDERED IN AN ASSESSMENT 
RESULT IN AN "UNDERASSESSMENT" OF THE PROPERTY 
The failure of the Petitioner to include the improve-
ments in its 1984 valuation of the property constitutes an 
"underassessment" and the available authority is clear that the 
County cannot go back and collect amounts claimed to be owing due 
to such an underassessment once the taxes have been paid and the 
property has changed hands. 
In Utah, undervalued property has been held to be not 
subject to reassessment in a subsequent year even though the Code 
(§59-5-17) permits the subsequent assessment of properties that 
"escaped assessment" in a prior year. Builders Components Supply 
Co. v. Cockayne, 450 P.2d 97 (Utah 1969). The Court interpreted 
§59-5-17 of the Code as allowing for assessment of property 
omitted, but not property that was merely undervalued in a prior 
year. The Court also stressed that tax statutes should be 
construed favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the 
taxing authority. 
Other jurisdictions with similar tax statutes have con-
sidered this same matter. These cases held that failure to 
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include improvements results in an undervaluation not correctable 
through a subsequent assessment. 
In 1932, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in State v. 
Mortgage-Bond Co. of New York, 140 So. 365 (Ala. 1932), deter-
mined that improvements which were not included in an assessment 
were not subsequently assessable as an "escape" under the Alabama 
statutes. In the Mortgage-Bond situation, as in the instant 
case, the State failed to assess taxes on improvements although 
the underlying land was assessed. The Alabama tax statutes are 
almost identical to the Utah statutes. The statutes require that 
the land and improvements thereon be listed separately on the tax 
rolls just as required by §59-5-1 of the Utah Code. The Alabama 
statutes provide for reassessment of "escaped" property as does 
§59-5-17 of the Utah Code. In deciding whether unassessed impro-
vements were "undervalued" or "escaped" property within the 
meaning of the statute, the Court pointed out that lands and 
improvements are not subject to separate tax liens. This is also 
true under Utah law (Utah Code Ann. §59-10-3 (1953)). The Court 
reasoned that the listing of lands and improvements separately 
was really an aid in fixing the tax valuation of the real estate 
as a whole. Therefore, where improvements were not assessed, 
this had to be regarded as an undervaluation of the real property 
rather than an escape, and therefore not assessable in subsequent 
years. 
A 
A more recent Oklahoma case also indicates that a non-
assessment of improvements constitutes an undervaluation rather 
than an omission. In Leyh v. Glass, 501 P.2d 259 (Okl. 1973), 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that improvements do not consti-
tute omitted property within a statute permitting assessment of 
property omitted from tax rolls in prior years. Here again, 
the Oklahoma statutes are identical to the Utah statutes. In 
Oklahoma real estate is defined as lands and improvements 
thereon, just as in the Utah Code definitions (§59-3-1(2)). The 
County Assessor in Oklahoma is required to assess and list land 
and improvements separately, as in Utah. Oklahoma also has a 
statute providing for the assessment of omitted properties. The 
Court concluded that, even though land and improvements are to be 
valued separately, this does not clearly indicate that the 
legislature intended to make structures on real estate a separate 
class of property for the purpose of taxation. 
Another major factor in the Court's decision that a non-
assessment of improvements constitutes an undervaluation rather 
than an omission was the hardship that permitting this to occur 
would place upon innocent subsequent purchasers of the property 
who would be stuck with having to pay the tax. The fact that the 
Oklahoma legislature failed to provide any protection for sub-
sequent purchasers lead the Court to conclude that the legisla-
ture did not intend to establish improvements as a separate class 
of real property which could constitute omitted property within 
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the meaning of the escape statute. Therefore, the Court held 
that, when the value of improvements is not included in the value 
of real property as shown on the tax rolls, such improvements do 
not constitute omitted property but rather an undervaluation 
which is not subject to reevaluation or reassessment. 
Two other cases which have reached the same conclusion 
are Westward Look Development Corporation, Inc. v. Department of 
Revenue of State of Arizona, 673 P.2d 26 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1983) 
and Whited v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 152 So. 552 (La. 1934) . 
Both cases hold that unassessed improvements are undervaluations 
for purposes of reassessment. In Whited, Louisiana law required 
the value of lands and improvements be recorded separately. As 
in the Mortgage-Bond case referred to above, the Court regarded 
the objective of this statutory requirement that land and impro-
vements be listed separately as one of providing information and 
not as intended to create a new category of property. In denying 
the government's right to reassess non-assessed improvements, the 
Louisiana Court relied on the statutory definition of real 
estate, which is similar to Utah's, including both lands and the 
structures located thereon. 
The Court in Westward Look, based part of its decision 
on the lack of warning of the adverse consequences to bona fide 
purchasers of real property if a rule construing non-assessments 
of improvements as omissions were adopted. The instant case 
involves just such a situation, where an unsuspecting purchaser 
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has had its property subjected to a lien and is being asked to 
pay tax relating to an assessment which occurred in a period 
prior to the date that the purchaser acquired an interest in the 
subject property. 
A key factor in the cases cited above was whether 
improvements on land are a separate class of property which 
"escaped" if not included in the valuation of the property on 
which the improvements are located. In Utah, as in the states in 
which those cases were decided, the statutory definition of real 
estate (§59-3-1(2)(c)) includes the improvements located thereon. 
Improvements and land are not subject to separate tax liens 
(§59-10-3). Listing the valuation of land and improvements 
separately pursuant to §59-5-1 is merely intended to assist the 
taxing entity and the taxpayer in evaluating the separate com-
ponents that are part of a total valuation of the "property". 
Under the law of this State, for tax purposes, improve-
ments are considered part of the real property. They will 
obviously influence its value as the natural features of the land 
might do. However, where an assessment of the real property has 
been made and the taxes paid, it would be as inappropriate to go 
back and attempt to levy additional taxes on the basis of omitted 
improvements as it would be on the basis of some overlooked 
natural feature of the property. Even if all proper value com-
ponents were not considered in arriving at an assessment, that 
would clearly not be a basis for further assessment as "escaped" 
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property under §59-5-17. Therefore, a failure to consider 
improvements might contribute to an underassessment but obviously 
not to an "escape". 
Petitioner cites Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan 
County, 64 Utah 335, 230 P. 1020 (1924), as its foundation for 
claiming Respondent is liable for an additional tax assessment. 
Petitioner's reliance on that case is entirely misplaced. Union 
Portland is easily distinguishable from the present case on its 
facts and is therefore not applicable to the case at hand. In 
Union Portland, the plaintiff owned real property that was 
assessed by the State Board of Equalization at the beginning of 
the 1921 tax year. Later in that same year, before the property 
taxes were paid, the Board discovered improvements on the pro-
perty which had not been accounted for in its prior assessment. 
The Board, within the same tax year, then reassessed the pro-
perty. The Court held that the Board's subsequent assessment was 
valid. In fashioning its decision, the Court relied on the 
applicable statute in force at the time which gave the Board the 
power to correct assessment errors before taxes on the property 
were paid. Specifically, the Court held that there is "no 
question concerning the precise power and duty to assess property 
that has been omitted any time before taxes have been paid". Id. 
at 1023 (emphasis added). 
There are two key facts in Union Portland that are a 
stark contrast to those in the instant case. In the case before 
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this Court, the property changed hands before the attempted 
reassessment took place. In addition, Respondent, relying on the 
assessment and full payment of taxes against the real property 
and improvements as recorded on the tax rolls, purchased the pro-
perty believing all taxes had been paid. Prior to the purchase, 
the former owner had paid the assessment for the year in question 
in full. In Union Portland a key element in allowing the 
reassessment was that it took place in the same tax year as the 
original assessment and before the taxes based on the original 
assessment had been paid. 
It is clear that the applicable case law, including 
Utah's, forbids the reassessment of taxes on property to include 
improvement values not considered where such reassessment occurs 
in a subsequent tax year and after the assessed taxes have been 
paid in full. The present case clearly fits within the standards 
outlined in the cases referred to above. Accordingly, Respondent 
should not be liable for newly assessed taxes relating to prior 
tax year assessments. 
Point II 
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF CASE LAW PROHIBITS 
REASSESSMENT OF OMITTED IMPROVEMENTS 
The great weight of authority in this Country does not 
allow retroactive reassessment on "omitted" or "escaped" improve-
ments on property which has already been assessed. Builders 
Components, supra; Westward Look, supra; Whited, supra; Davidson 
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v. Franklin Ave. Inv. Co.f 151 N.W. 537 (Minn. 1915) ; Woll v. 
Thomas, 27 N.E. 578 (Ind. App. Ct. 1891); Williams v. Segur, 1 
N.E. 707 (Ind. 1885); German Savings Bank v. Trowbridge, 100 N.E. 
333 (Iowa 1904); Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 64 So. 110 
(Ala. 1913); City of Georgetown v. Graves1 Administrator, 178 
S.W. 1035 (Ky. 1915); Delta Land and Timber Co. v. Police Jury, 
125 So. 585 (La. 1924); Langhout v. First Nat. Bank, 183 N.W. 506 
(Iowa 1921). 
Petitioner, in attempting to justify its propositions, 
relies on specific cases in claiming retroactive assessments are 
allowed where improvements on land are not considered during the 
original assessment. The cited cases are easily distinguishable 
on their facts and, therefore, are not applicable to the case at 
hand. In Korash v. Mills, 263 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1972), the Supreme 
Court allowed a back assessment of property taxes for property on 
which a motel had been built during the previous tax year. 
Plaintiffs had begun and completed construction of a motel on 
their property during 1966. In 1967, they received the same tax 
assessment on the property they had received in 1966 before the 
motel was constructed. In 1968, the defendant tax assessor, 
realizing the undervaluation in the prior tax year, made a 
reassessment on the property for the 1967 tax year. In allowing 
the reassessment the Court found that the plaintiff was involved 
in the operation of large motel properties and was familiar with 
what is involved in the assessment of taxes against such proper-
ties. 
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Because of this, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff 
knew or should have known that the original 1967 tax assessment 
did not correctly reflect the value of the new motel on the pro-
perty . 
In addressing situations analagous to the case at hand, 
the Court reaffirmed prior holdings disallowing reassessments 
after tax roles became final in a given year because of the 
"inherent evils which would allow belated adjustments upward and 
downward, creating instability and causing inequitable future 
variances between buyers and sellers regarding tax prorations 
and obligations,ff Id, at 582 (emphasis added). 
Unlike Korash the Respondent in this case did not know 
that the tax assessment which occurred prior to Respondent's 
purchase of the property was incorrect. Indeed, Respondent 
relied on the current tax rolls in determining that the prior 
assessment had been paid in full! Respondent's problem falls 
into the problem area the Korash Court warned of regarding inno-
cent purchasers. 
As further support for its contentions, Petitioner cites 
Mueller v. Mercer County, 60 N.W. 2d 768 (N.D. 1953) in which the 
Supreme Court allowed reassessment of property where the original 
assessment for two tax years failed to include a residence which 
had been on the property a number of years prior to the 
assessments in question. The property had been in the plain-
tiff's name since before the omission of the residence in the 
assessment by the County Assessor. In fact, the plaintiff had 
received assessments in the tax years prior to and after the 
omission which did include the value of the residence. The Court 
held the reassessment valid, reasoning that the plaintiff was or 
should have been aware that some omission by the assessor had 
taken place because the assessments for the years in question 
were substantially different than those prior or subsequent 
thereto. 
Again, unlike Mueller, Respondent in the present case 
had no way of knowing if the prior assessment outlined in the tax 
rolls was incorrect. Respondent simply assumed that, since the 
tax assessment for the prior year had been paid in full, there 
were no delinquent taxes on the property. Indeed, if this case 
had been decided in the Mueller jurisdiction, the applicable sta-
tutes there would have precluded Petitioner from reassessing the 
property since such reassessment can only occur "if the rights of 
a purchaser for value without actual or constructive notice of 
such error or omission shall not be prejudiced by such correc-
tion, addition, or assessment." jto. at 682. 
Petitioner further cites Chew v. Board of Assessment 
Appeals, 673 P.2d 1028 (Col. App. Ct. 1983) where the Appellate 
Court held that a reassessment of property was valid against an 
owner who had held the property for several years both before and 
after the assessment in question. 
Again, unlike Chew, the Respondent here had not owned the 
property for several years prior to the reassessment. Respondent 
did not know there were delinquent taxes owing on the property. 
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Indeed, Respondent purchased the property only after reviewing 
the tax rolls for previous years and determing that all taxes 
were fully paid. 
Petitioner, in conclusion, cites to Municipality of 
Anchorage v. Alaska Distributors Co., 725 P.2d 692 (Alaska 1986) 
wherein the Alaska Supreme Court sustained an assessment on pro-
perty on which an additional warehouse had been built by the 
defendant. The defendant did not advise the assessor of the 
additional warehouse, which it was obligated to do by statute. 
The assessor discovered the error after a number of years and the 
property was reassessed. 
In distinguishing Alaska Distributors from the case at 
hand, it is undisputed that the Respondent did not own the pro-
perty in question at the time the undervaluation occurred. 
Respondent was totally unaware that taxes were outstanding. All 
indications from the tax rolls were that the assessments against 
the property were complete and the taxes were fully paid. Further, 
the Court in Alaska Distributors cited with approval an earlier 
case from that jurisdiction which did not allow a reassessment 
for omitted improvements on property that was purchased by a 
party where, at the time of the sale, no notice of delinquent 
taxes for property appeared on the tax rolls. The Alaska Distri-
butors Court reaffirmed the prior holding that the purchaser 
(new owner) is not liable for delinquent taxes because he is 
entitled to rely on assessment notices which did not disclose any 
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delinquency. See Anchorage Independent School District v. 
Stephens, 370 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1962). 
As established above, the vast majority of Courts have 
held that reassessments in subsequent tax years for "omitted 
improvements" on property are not allowed. Particularly has this 
conclusion been reached in situations where a party has purchased 
property, checked the tax rolls, found no delinquent taxes, and 
assumed that all prior assessments are complete and that all 
taxes have been paid in full. To hold such a purchaser liable 
for such reassessments is to impose a hardship upon him 
impossible to bear. Such is the case with the Respondent in this 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
The property in question was "undervalued" by Petitioner 
when it failed to include the improvements thereon. Said improve-
ments are not "escaped" property but are "omitted" property and 
are not subject to reassessment in prior tax years. For all the 
reasons set forth above, Petitioner should not be allowed to 
retroactively reassess the property. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1987. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
By \l^^C^(^T^ 
Philip fc. Pugsley 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sunkist Service Co. 
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.«_ J 9* 1! . " ^ P 6 1 ^ " <<real estate/' 'Improvements," "personal property," 
•value, defined.—In this title, unless the context or subject matter other-
wise requires: 
(1) "Property" means property which is subject to assessment and 
taxation according to its value, and does not include moneys, credits 
bonds, stocks, representative property, franchises, good will, copyrights! 
patents, or other things commonly known as intangibles. 
(2) "Real estate" includes 
(a) The possession of, claim to, ownership of or right to the possession 
of, land. 
(b) All mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all 
timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or being on the 
lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privileges 
appertaining thereto. 
(c) Improvements. 
(3) "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences 
and improvements erected upon or aflBxed to the land, whether the title 
has been acquired to the land or not. 
(4) "Personal property" includes 
(a) Every class of property as defined in subsection (1) hereof which 
is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning of the 
terms "real estate" and "improvements." 
(b) Gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets or alleys. 
(c) Bridges and ferries. 
(5) "Value" and "full cash value" mean the amount at which the 
property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent 
debtor. 
59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property.—All taxable property, not spe-
cifically exempt under Article XIII, section 2, of the Constitution of Utah, 
must be assessed at thirty per cent of its reasonable fair cash value. Land 
and the improvements thereon must be separately assessed. 
59-5-17. Property escaping assessment—Five-year limitation period on 
assessment—Duties of assessor.—Any property discovered by the assessor 
to have escaped assessment may be assessed at any time as far back as five 
years prior to the time of discovery, and the assessor shall enter such 
assessments on the tax rolls in the hands of the county treasurer or else-
where, and when so assessed shall be reported by the assessor to the county 
auditor, if made after the assessment book has been delivered to the county 
treasurer, and the auditor shall charge the eoxmty assessor with the taxes 
on such property, and the assessor shall give notice to the person assessed 
therewith and the assessor shall forthwith proceed to secure or collect the 
taxes as provided in chapter 10 of this title. 
59-10-3. Nature and extent of lien.—Every tax upon real property is 
a lien against the property assessed; and every tax due upon improvements 
upon real estate assessed to others than the owner of the real estate is a 
lien upon the land and improvements; which several liens attach as of the 
1st day in January of each year. 
